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ABSTRACT. Most of the literature on the causes of tropical deforestation has focused on the proximate and distal causes. However,
research exploring the psychological drivers of deforestation, i.e., motivations, is still scant despite being crucial to understand the
processes of land-use change and individual decision making within social-ecological systems. We studied the combined effect of
structural and individual causes of deforestation, with particular emphasis on motivations, for a sample of rural households in
Colombia’s foremost tropical deforestation frontier. We implemented a new instrument based on self-determination theory to measure
five different types of motivations to protect the forests: intrinsic, guilt/regret, social, extrinsic motivations, and amotivation (lack of
motivation). Our findings show that, controlling for the structural and household drivers widely identified in the deforestation literature,
intrinsic motivations positively correlate with less self-reported deforestation. Also, amotivated people and those with extrinsic motives,
such as expected payments for conservation, are more likely to deforest. Our results show that motivations can explain variation in
land-use decisions and thus should be considered when designing, implementing, and evaluating conservation policies aiming to halt
deforestation.
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INTRODUCTION
Tropical deforestation continues to be a major concern in the
developing world. About 129 million ha of forest was lost between
1990 and 2015 mainly in the tropical regions of South America
and Africa (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations 2015). Identifying distal and proximate drivers of tropical
deforestation has been one of the main concerns of the literature
on land-use change (Kaimowitz and Angelsen 1998, Lambin et
al. 2001, Geist and Lambin 2002, DeFries et al. 2010). Most of
these studies focus on both the behavior of landholders and the
structural processes that affect such behavior, based on objective
or observable factors. These studies have explored the
demographic, economic, institutional, and cultural factors that
lead agents to clear forests (Geist and Lambin 2002). Such
research has been developed at different scales: from the
household or firm level to regional, national, and global scales,
and using analytical, empirical, or simulation models (Kaimowitz
and Angelsen 1998).  
Although civic values and behavioral factors have been described
as important drivers of deforestation (Geist and Lambin 2001),
little systematic effort has been made to link motivations, i.e., the
set of reasons to protect the forests, to the observed patterns of
land-use change in tropical settings. Other fields of study, such as
environmental psychology, have focused on understanding the
relationship between proenvironmental motivations and
behaviors, mostly in urban settings, e.g., car use, energy saving,
and recycling. In general, this body of literature has established
that both contextual and individual factors such as attitudes,
motivations, goals, values, beliefs, concerns, and self-identity
influence behaviors that benefit the environment (Steg and Vlek
2009). Also, the literature on environmental studies and policy
has attempted to establish the effect of conservation programs on
motivations (Rico García-Amado et al. 2013, Moros et al. 2017)
and drivers of engagement in particular conservation practices
or programs (Greiner et al. 2009, Souto et al. 2014, Greiner 2015,
Ruiz-Mallén et al. 2015). However, to our knowledge, no study
has attempted to determine the interaction between
proenvironmental motivations of rural dwellers and stated land-
use change. Understanding baseline motivations of rural
inhabitants and forest users is important given that the design of
policy instruments aiming at reducing deforestation may have
unintended effects on motivations, which, in turn, can affect
conservation outcomes and behaviors (see, e.g., Rico García-
Amado et al. 2013, Moros et al. 2017).  
We studied the effect of motivations on the stated decision to
deforest for a group of farmers, controlling for individual and
structural variables. We used the questionnaire designed by Moros
et al. (2017), based on the self-determination theory (SDT)
proposed by Ryan and Deci (2000), to explore the different types
of motivations and their effect on the reported decision of farmers
to deforest. Using a set of different types of motivations allows
us to capture more precisely the specific reasons behind preserving
forests and, as such, design and improve programs and policies
suited to particular types of individuals. We applied a survey to
a group of 64 farmers in the rural area of Florencia, the capital
city of Caquetá, one of the regions with the highest rates of
deforestation in Colombia. Our findings show that, controlling
for socio-economic factors, intrinsic motivations negatively
correlate with self-reported deforestation. That is, more
intrinsically motivated individuals report less deforestation. Also,
amotivated individuals are more likely to deforest, as well as
people concerned with external motivations such as expected
payments for conservation. Our findings contribute to the
discussion of land-use change beyond the proximate and distal
or underlying causes of deforestation usually considered in the
literature. Although our empirical strategy does not allow us to
claim causality, our results open an urgent and unexplored
research agenda and raise considerations for the implementation
of conservation policies, such as payment for ecosystems services,
aimed at changing behavior. In particular, they highlight the
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importance of considering the impacts on motivations when
designing, implementing, and evaluating the effects of such types
of policies to avoid possible crowding-out effects (Agrawal et al.
2015).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Evolution of the drivers of land-use change
There is a large body of literature that attempts to unravel the
causes of land-use change (Turner et al. 2007). Original studies
on tropical deforestation found population to be the main
explanatory variable, either because of the so-called frontier
theory, in which entrepreneurs and smallholders colonized the
frontier in search of profitable economic activities, or because
they were pushed out of the agricultural frontier and into
marginal lands, i.e., the “immiseration” theory (Rudel and Roper
1997). When more variables were included, population started to
lose its prominence as the main driver of deforestation, and other
elements such as road building, state-sponsored development
programs, and credit availability began to combine with
population to explain deforestation in areas such as the Brazilian
Amazon (Pfaff  1999).  
The causes of deforestation have since been classified as direct or
proximate and distal or underlying. According to Geist and
Lambin (2002), proximate causes include local-level human
activities such as agricultural expansion or infrastructure
development that affect land-use decisions and, therefore, forest
cover. Underlying driving forces are social processes, such as
human population dynamics or agricultural policies that support
the proximate causes. Underlying causes can operate at a local,
national, or global level.  
Empirical studies of drivers of deforestation have been
summarized in two seminal meta-analyses (Kaimowitz and
Angelsen 1998, Geist and Lambin 2002). Kaimowitz and
Angelsen (1998) identify farm-level explanatory factors of
deforestation, such as wages, availability of off-farm employment,
and the price of agricultural inputs. As wages increase, off-farm
employment is more abundant, and the price of agricultural
inputs rises, as the pressure on forests decreases. Geist and Lambin
(2002) separate the causes of deforestation into biophysical,
technological or economic, institutional, demographic, and
cultural. Their analysis shows that different combinations of
proximate and underlying driving forces determine tropical forest
decline worldwide (Lambin et al. 2001). The basic assumption of
these studies is that land users behave like rational agents who
respond to price incentives, given by the opportunity cost of
deforestation. Within such models, only instrumental reasons
guide land-use decisions. In some cases, other considerations, such
as values and beliefs, are mentioned, but how they shape people’s
behaviors is not theorized (Geist and Lambin 2002).  
More recent studies have reported that clearly established
property rights are associated with less deforestation (Robinson
et al. 2014). Additionally, because deforestation decisions depend
on expected profits, neighborhood deforestation influences the
probability of deforestation in a particular parcel. There are,
therefore, patterns of spatial interactions in deforestation
(Robalino and Pfaff  2012).  
Drivers and patterns of deforestation also evolve over time
because of changes in international markets, globalization, and
urbanization. Thus, instead of focusing exclusively on the local
causes of land change, newer streams of research have identified
the importance of its distant drivers. Currently, the main agents
of deforestation are private agricultural enterprises, i.e., well-
capitalized ranchers, farmers, and loggers, that have led the
activity, in particular in Southeast Asia and the Amazon basin,
to satisfy global markets (Rudel et al. 2009, DeFries et al. 2010).
It is the demand for agricultural products in distant urban and
international locations that is fueling current deforestation
(Leblois et al. 2017). Globalization affects land-use change
directly by increasing the opportunity cost of forested land. Also,
the “geographies of trade” that interconnect distant social-
ecological systems cause leakage or indirect effects on land use
within and across countries as a consequence of local or national
interventions (Meyfroidt et al. 2013). For example, policies to
promote sustainable land use in a specific site may have
unintended effects by displacing land change to less regulated
places. These studies focus on global-scale social processes that
are shaping decisions on the land. Urbanization, for instance,
increases the demand for agricultural commodities, such as
vegetable oils, widely used in processed food. This demand is
manifested in price transmission to local land users, increasing
the profitability of soy or palm cultivation in tropical regions.
Because the main agents of land change are companies and
entrepreneurs, decision making is mainly related to extrinsic,
profit-seeking motives. In some instances, reputational risks for
branded companies might deter them from engaging in
deforestation, either direct or indirectly through their providers,
but the underlying motives are profit driven (Mayer and Gereffi
2010).  
As the role of international markets becomes more prominent in
explaining land transformation, agricultural intensification has
been suggested as a strategy to reduce the use of forested land for
agriculture while satisfying agricultural demand. However,
empirical analysis has shown a weak or nonexistent relationship
between intensification and land sparing for conservation (Phelps
et al. 2013). Intensification can increase future agricultural land
rents, which creates incentives to clear more land for agricultural
expansion, particularly when driven by market pressures (Phalan
et al. 2011, Byerlee et al. 2014, Carrasco et al. 2014). Thus, whether
farmers have market outlets for their crops, especially in the
international market, could be a significant driver of
deforestation. All of these studies are based on the assumption
that only extrinsic, instrumental reasons explain farmers’
behavior toward deforestation. We take into account some of
these variables to predict self-reported deforestation but add a
more complex and wider array of motivations for engaging in
deforestation in the forest frontier.
Motivations and environmental behavior
Although behavioral factors have been described as important in
driving deforestation (Geist and Lambin 2001), little systematic
effort has been made to link intrinsic motivations, i.e., the set of
noninstrumental reasons to protect the forests, to the observed
patterns of land-use change. One stream of literature, particularly
in environmental psychology, has studied the role of values,
beliefs, and attitudes to understand the determinants of urban
proenvironmental behavior, e.g., energy saving, recycling, and
composting. In addition, studies applied to rural contexts focus
on the effect of attitudes on environmental practices and
Ecology and Society 24(1): 4
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol24/iss1/art4/
conservation behavior, but few efforts have been made to link such
psychological aspects to land-use change, which is our objective.  
Different theories are used to model the determinants of
proenvironmental behavior (e.g., theory of reasoned action:
Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; values-norms beliefs: Stern 2000; theory
of planned behavior: Ajzen 1991, among others). We use SDT
(Ryan and Deci 2000) as our framework because of its predictive
power in explaining proenvironmental behaviors (Festré and
Garrouste 2015). SDT, instead of conceiving motivations as a
dichotomous phenomenon of motivated and amotivated people,
proposes a model with six types of motives guiding human
behavior: intrinsic, integrated, introjected, identified, external,
and amotivated. People are intrinsically motivated if  they protect
forests because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable, whereas
people who are amotivated lack an interest or see no reason to
do so. In between, there are four different types of extrinsic
motivations that vary in their degree of autonomy and
internalization. Autonomy is understood as the psychological
need for “the experience of choice” (Moller et al. 2006:104) and
internalization, as “a proactive process through which people
transform regulation by external contingencies into regulation by
internal processes” (Deci et al. 1991:328). It is important to
understand extrinsic motivation because most of the tasks
individuals undertake are not inherently valued or enjoyable.  
The least autonomous form of extrinsic motivation is external
regulation in which an individual’s behavior is motivated by an
expected external reward or punishment and there is no
internalization process involved. Introjected regulation is
somewhat more autonomous given that feelings of guilt, anxiety,
or pride, among others, drive behavior. In other words,
introjection occurs when behavior is motivated by self-esteem
contingencies and controlled by feelings of pressure to maintain
or enhance self-esteem and the feeling of worth. A more
autonomous form of extrinsic motivation is identified
motivation, which occurs when an individual identifies with the
personal importance of the behavior “and has thus accepted its
regulation as his or her own” (Ryan and Deci 2000:62), but the
drivers of action continue to be somewhat external to the self. The
most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation is integrated
motivation, in which identified motivations have been fully
assimilated to the self. Integrated and intrinsic motivations are
both autonomous forms of motivations; however, they differ in
the sense that under integrated motivation the action is motivated
by its instrumental value, whereas under intrinsic motivation the
action is motivated by its inherent value. In this framework, there
is no ideal sequence or “evolution” of motivations, or, in the
authors’ own words, “we do not suggest that the continuum
underlying types of extrinsic motivation is a developmental
continuum” (Ryan and Deci 2000:62).  
Three types of feelings determine how people move through
different types of motivations: autonomy, competence, and social
relatedness. Any external reward that affects one of these three
“moderators” is expected to affect intrinsic motivations.
Interventions that support autonomy and feelings of self-efficacy,
i.e., feeling capable or as having the skills to perform an activity,
and that enhance or activate one’s relationship to others as well
as one’s self-image (social relatedness) are expected to maintain
intrinsic motivation for a task and more self-determined types of
extrinsic motivation. For example, social interventions perceived
as controlling have an effect on individuals’ feelings of autonomy,
thus negatively affecting intrinsic motivations to perform a task.  
As described by Moros et al. (2017), empirical analyses in
environmental psychology and environmental studies commonly
rely on self-reported responses to questionnaire items to identify
both the frequency of environmental practices and the patterns
of attitudes, beliefs, and motivations that drive such reported
behavior (Steg and Vlek 2009). Ruiz-Mallén et al. (2015) and
Souto et al. (2014), for example, explored engagement in
community-based conservation activities, while Greiner and
colleagues (Greiner et al. 2009, Greiner 2015) analyzed farmers’
willingness to participate in biodiversity contracts. These studies
make use of semistructured interviews, surveys based on Likert
scales, and focus groups to capture individuals’ reasons to
participate in conservation programs. However, this body of
literature refers to attitudes, motivations, social norms, emotions,
and perceptions as if  they were equivalent, which limits its
comparability, because no unified language is used.  
Nonetheless, despite being measured and labeled in different ways,
most of the studies in this field report two broad categories:
instrumental versus noninstrumental reasons. Instrumental
reasons include economic benefits derived from ecosystem
services or social rewards such as recognition or reputation,
whereas noninstrumental reasons include a sense of moral duty,
respect for nature and animals, or stewardship ethics (Rode et al.
2015). In general, strong noninstrumental reasons favoring
conservation positively correlate to proenvironmental behavior
(Lynne et al. 1988, Beedell and Rehman 1999, Ryan et al. 2003,
Price and Leviston 2014), whereas strong instrumental reasons
toward profit maximization affect proenvironmental behavior
either negatively or not at all (Ryan et al. 2003, Greiner et al.
2009).  
In both environmental psychology and environmental studies,
different types of motivations are reported to guide
proenvironmental behavior. However, most of the studies applied
to rural contexts focus on the effect of attitudes/motivations in
environmental practices and conservation behavior (Gelcich et al.
2008, Greiner et al. 2009, Greiner 2015). To our knowledge, we




The study was carried out in the region of El Caraño within the
rural area of Florencia, an Amazonian city in southwestern
Colombia. The study area is part of the Amazon foothills, a region
that links the Andes with the Amazon basin, a key biodiversity
ecotone and a major area of deforestation. Our study involves
participants from 13 rural districts from El Caraño, a colonization
frontier where displaced families from other regions in Colombia
have moved over the last 40 years. These villages were included in
the study because they are located in the headwaters of the Hacha
River, the main water source for the 170,000 urban inhabitants of
the city of Florencia, and because of the significant area of
remaining forest they harbor (Moros et al. 2017).  
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Table 1. Description of items and the correspondent statements of motivations survey. Source: Moros et al. (2017).
 
Motivation Type Survey Statements
Intrinsic 1. “I enjoy when I do not clear the forest.”
2. “I see myself  as someone who does not clear the forests.”
Guilt or regret 1. “I would feel guilty if  I clear the forests.”
2. “I would regret if  I clear the forests.”
Social 1. “I would be criticized by my neighbors if  I clear the forests.”
2. “Significant others would be upset if  I clear the forests.”
Extrinsic, payments “I would take care of forests only if  I am paid to do so.”
Extrinsic, fines “I do not cut down the forests because of fear [of] fines that might be imposed by environmental authorities.”
Amotivation “I do not see what I can get from protecting the forests. There is no point in doing so.”
Agriculture and cattle ranching have driven forest clearing in El
Caraño (Vásquez 2015), and the area is populated by more than
100 families, mainly smallholders who cultivate staple foods
combined with coffee, sugarcane, and pastures. There are few
large farms; average farm size in the area is 35 ha, and the median
is 15 ha (Vélez et al. 2016).  
In our fieldwork, farmers mentioned deforestation as their main
environmental concern caused mainly by conversion to
subsistence agriculture. There are no official records of
deforestation rates for our study area, but, based on available
forest cover data for the 13 rural districts that were part of the
study zone, 7879 ha of the 10,588 ha (74%) is still forested. Almost
19% of the forest in the zone is highly vulnerable to deforestation
because of its proximity to roads and to the agricultural frontier.
On average, forests cover 50% of the farms, whereas the rest is
allocated to pastures; cash crops, such as coffee and sugarcane;
and subsistence crops. The villages in the study area are located
at higher altitudes and are adjacent to two national protected
areas (Vélez et al. 2016).  
Smallholders live in poverty: Incomes are low, access to education
is limited, and they possess few or no assets. Average household
size is 4 people, and migration patterns have been very dynamic:
People arrived in the region 11 years ago, on average, but there is
a large dispersion in the data, with some households having
resided in the area for more than 40 years, and others having
resided there for just a few months. Fewer than 40% of households
declare that they have a legal land title (Vélez et al. 2016).
Data and variables
Our source of data is a household survey conducted by Vélez et
al. (2016) between June and September 2016 in 13 villages.
Although we tried to contact all households in the study area, we
reached only 64 respondents, equivalent to approximately 60% of
household heads in the villages, according to our own field
assessment because there are no recent census data for the region.
Dwellers are mainly mestizo peasants, from several regions in
Colombia that have been forced to leave more productive rural
areas and move to this agricultural frontier.  
In the survey, we asked about motivations to protect forests, socio-
demographics, productive practices, perceptions of environmental
problems, existing forms of social capital, and land-use history
(see Appendix 1 for full questionnaire in Spanish). The data
helped us establish whether farmers have cleared forests since their
arrival in the region and which socio-demographic and economic
conditions might have influenced that behavior.  
We designed a logit model in which we explain the decision of
farmers to clear forest as a function of different social, economic,
biophysical, and motivational factors, following those usually
measured in the literature. The biophysical variables linked to
deforestation are slope, altitude, and distance to markets. Farmers
are expected to clear forest for agriculture if  the land is suitable
for cultivation in terms of slope and altitude, and if  they are close
to markets, which reduces transaction costs. The economic
characteristics include self-reported measures of household
income; farm size, as a proxy for wealth; and whether households
engage in commercial cultivation, i.e., coffee, sugar, and cattle
ranching. We expect wealthier households and those engaged in
commercial activities to have engaged in forest clearing. As for
the social characteristics of the household, we include the time of
residence on the farm; household size; a binary variable relating
to land tenure, i.e., property title; age of the household head; and
a binary variable for participation in local, voluntary
organizations. We ran a comparison of these variables between
the samples to identify variables that could influence the decision
to cut forest. For this, we used a two-sample Fligner-Policello
robust rank-order test for ordinal or interval data and chi-square
test for categorical data. The two-sample Fligner-Policello robust
rank-order test is an alternative of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test that assumes neither normality, nor equal variances, nor equal
distribution (Feltovich 2003).  
Finally, we rely on the questionnaire developed by Moros et al.
(2017) to measure motivations among rural dwellers to protect
the forest. This questionnaire follows SDT and Pelletier et al.’s
(1998) motivation toward the environment scale. The survey
contains 9 statements intended to measure 5 different types of
reasons to protect the forests: intrinsic, guilt/regret, social,
extrinsic motivations, and lack of motivation (see Table 1 for a
summary of survey statements). We would like to point out that
the original motivation questionnaire was made up of 24 items.
The 9 items we used to capture each type of motivation are those
that after conducting a factor analysis, had a factor loading of
above 0.55 as suggested by Hair et al. (2009). The survey, designed
and implemented in Spanish by native speakers, used a 4-point
bipolar Likert scale to capture variations in the motivations to
protect forests. The scale is symmetric, ranging from 1 (totally
disagree) to 4 (totally agree). Items were presented in the same
order each time. Although we did not control for order effects,
items were spread through the entire survey, thus reducing the
risk of consistency across responses in relation to the motivations.
For intrinsic, guilt/regret, and social motivations, we created
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indexes of responses giving equal weights to each item considering
that, to our knowledge, there are no theoretical reasons to impute
different weights to particular items.  
Following SDT, we expect individuals with higher levels of
intrinsic, guilt, and social motivations to be less likely to clear the
forests because they have internalized the importance of taking
care of the forests either because of pleasure, i.e., intrinsic
motivations; self-approval, i.e., guilt- and regret-related
motivations; or social approval, i.e., social motivations. Further,
we expect intrinsic motivations to be stronger predictors of forest
protection compared with less self-determined types of
motivations (guilt, regret, social, or external) because, as
mentioned previously, intrinsic motivations have been shown to
increase proenvironmental behaviors (De Groot and Steg 2010).
For extrinsic motivators, such as potential payments and fines,
we expect a positive relationship with deforestation because, for
these individuals, taking care of forest is contingent on external
rewards or punishments, i.e., proenvironmental behavior is not
internalized. In this line of reasoning, we expect amotivated
individuals to be the most likely to deforest when compared with
all other motivational types because this type of motivation is the
least autonomous and self-determined.
RESULTS
Descriptive results
We used two nonparametric tests, the two-sample Fligner-
Policello robust rank-order test for ordinal or interval data and
the chi-square test for categorical data, to explore whether
households that had cleared forests since their arrival at the farm
(33% of respondents) were significantly different from their
counterparts (Table 2). We observed that the two samples are
similar in most biophysical and productive characteristics, except
that farms that report having cut down forests are larger, have
more land in forests, and are farther away from main roads than
farms that have not been deforested. Also, the percentages of
sugarcane growers and cattle ranchers are significantly higher for
those households that have cut down forests. The households that
have deforested are significantly more dependent on crop-related
income than their counterparts. Demographic characteristics
such as education, household size, and age of the household head
are not significantly different between the two samples. Only the
time of residence is different, with households that have engaged
in deforestation having resided in the region for longer. Regarding
motivations, intrinsic and social motivations are, as expected,
significantly lower among heads of households that report having
cut down forests.
Logistic model
We built a logistic model to assess the role of different variables
in predicting the binary decision of having cut down forest in the
past (has cut down forest = 1; has not cut down forest = 0). We
report odds ratios for 8 models in Table 3. Model (1) includes
biophysical, socio-economic, and income source variables.
Models (2) to (7) include a different type of motivation in each
regression. We do not report a model including all types of
motivations at the same time because, although they capture
different types of motives, some of them are correlated causing
multicollinearity. This correlation implies that each motivation
coefficient in models (2) to (7) could be capturing other motives.
Table 4 reports a correlation matrix showing that, in fact, four
correlations are statistically significant. Intrinsic and guilt-related
motivations are, as expected by SDT theory, positively correlated.
Payments for conservation, a specific type of extrinsic motivation,
is negatively correlated with intrinsic and guilt motivations, i.e.,
the two types of most internalized and autonomous motivations.
We found an unexpected significant correlation between fines and
social motivations, which are positively correlated, meaning that
people who reported fines to be an important motive for forest
conservation also reported peer pressure from neighbors and
relatives as an important driver for the task. We also calculated
the variance inflation factor for these variables to analyze the
severity of multicollinearity. We found that all motivation
coefficients are inflated by an order of 4 or more, indicating the
impossibility of combining all the variables in the same model.
Thus, to have stable and reliable beta coefficients, we first test the
different motivations independently in models (2) to (7) because
it is in our interest to disentangle the differences between types of
motivations and deforestation behavior. However, as a robustness
test, in Table 5, we repeat the models in Table 3 with different
combinations of motivations. In each version, models (8) to (13),
we include those motivations that are not significantly correlated
with each other, and results are consistent. We do not include a
model with a motivation index, because our interest, beyond
asserting the value of motivations in decision making, is to find
out which of them are significantly associated with specific
behaviors. By presenting an aggregate index, we would lose that
information. SDT theory precisely argues the relevance of
understanding motivation as a continuum and not as an
aggregated dichotomous phenomenon. In fact, policy
instruments may affect each motivation type differently (see
Moros et al. 2017).  
Variables commonly reported in the literature as drivers of
deforestation, such as farm size, altitude, distance to nearest road,
and plot slope, do not affect the likelihood of cutting down forests
in our study, nor do socio-demographic variables, such as age,
education, or household size, predict deforestation. Nonetheless,
households that report having sugarcane on their farm are more
likely to deforest across models. Likewise, households farther
away from main roads are more likely to have cut down forests
since their arrival to the plot. For our particular interest, those
heads of households who report more intrinsic motivations to
protect forests are less likely to deforest, whereas those that report
payments as the only reason for forest protection are more likely
to cut down forests. This result is robust to different specifications,
even those that include different motivations simultaneously.
Heads of households lacking any motivation to protect forests
are also more likely to deforest. However, the amotivated variable
loses significance when we include other types of motivations in
the same model. None of the other motivations, i.e., guilt, social,
or fines, significantly explain having cut down forest areas in any
of the models reported.
DISCUSSION
We move beyond the proximate and distal causes of land-use
change and consider the effect of individual motivations on
deforestation in the region with the highest deforestation rates in
Colombia. Controlling for socio-economic factors, we find that
intrinsic motivations negatively correlate with self-reported
deforestation. In addition, amotivated and extrinsically
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Table 2. Descriptive characteristics of farmers. Note: Asterisks represent differences between groups, using two-sample Fligner-Policello
robust rank-order test for ordinal or interval data and chi-square test for categorical data. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Standard
errors in parentheses.
 







Biophysical and productive characteristics of the farm
Size of the farm (hectares) 30.14** (25.82) 25.55 (42.21) 0.0334
Size of the productive area (hectares)
†
8.91 (6.70) 9.73 (18.65) 0.1562
Proportion of productive area relative to total area (%) 29.90 (18.09) 32.47 (23.44) 0.4093
Size of area in forest (hectares) 13.26** (17.69) 10.66 (19.08) 0.0375
Proportion of area in forests relative to total area (%) 39.66* (22.12) 31.66 (23.36) 0.0756
Proportion of area in forests/stubble relative to total area (%) 54.41 (17.48) 59.32 (23.40) 0.1570
Altitude (meters above sea level) 1065.05 (149.71) 999.62 (210.83) 0.1263
Slope (degrees) 44.469 (8.399) 41.562 (12.361) 0.1346
Distance to nearest road (meters) 2167.82*** (1910.30) 806.40 (1258.94) 0.0096
Productive uses of the land
Coffee (% farmers) 71.42 (46.29) 65.11 (48.22) 0.614
Coffee (hectares) 1.40 (0.973) 1.12 (0.7441) 0.219
Sugarcane (% farmers) 80.95** (40.24) 51.16 (50.58) 0.022
Sugarcane (hectares) 95.25 (1.078) 80.74 (0.969) 0.484
Pasture (% farmers) 85.71 (35.86) 67.44 (47.41) 0.120
Pasture (hectares) 10.19 (13.65) 7.39 (11.73) 0.128
Cattle (% farmers) 61.90** (49.76) 34.88 (48.22) 0.041
Cattle (units) 8.38 (8.99) 9.86 (12.93) 0.372
Socioeconomic characteristics of the household
Time living on the farm (years) 15.76** (14.78) 10.93 (13.01) 0.0371
Household size 3.67 (1.65) 3.72 (1.67) 0.4778
Formal property of land (%) 38.09 (49.76) 44.18 (50.25) 0.643
Education level of most educated member of household (years) 6.67 (3.71) 6.66 (3.84) 0.4622
Education level of the household head (years) 4.09 (3.88) 3.61 (3.25) 0.4454
Age of the household head (years) 50.05 (15.03) 50.70 (13.58) 0.4506
Sex of the household head (% male) 80.95 (40.23) 81.4 (39.37) 0.966
Monthly income (US$)
‡
142.95 (120.53) 178.15 (143.66) 0.1842
Preference for their offspring to become farmers (%) 65.00 (48.94) 68.29 (47.11) 0.8357
Social capital and social networks
Household head member of productive or community organization (%) 19.04 (40.24) 16.27 (37.35) 0.783
People in this rural district (1-3 scale): 2.14 (0.654) 2.23 (0.751) 0.2993
Help each other a lot (%) 28.57 41.86
Do not help each other that much (%) 57.14 39.53
Do not help each other at all (%) 14.29 18.6
Income sources (% farmers)
Crops 80.95 (40.24) 65.11 (48.22) 0.193
Cattle ranching 33.33 (48.30) 18.60 (39.37) 0.192
Wage laborer 57.14 (50.71) 53.48 (50.47) 0.783
Self-employed 0 (0) 6.98 (25.78) 0.215
Employee 9.5 (30.08) 13.95 (35.06) 0.615
Diversified income source 95.24 (21.82) 72.09 (45.38) 0.1351
Main income source (% farmers)
Crops 57.14* (50.71) 32.55 (47.41) 0.060
Cattle ranching 14.28 (35.86) 4.65 (21.31) 0.177
Wage laborer 9.52 (30.08) 25.58 (44.15) 0.134
Self-employed 0 (0) 4.65 (21.31) 0.315
Employee 4.76 (21.83) 9.30 (29.39) 0.525
Motivations (scale 1-4)
Intrinsic 2.85** (0.76) 3.22 (0.69) 0.0306
"I see myself  as someone who does not clear the forests." 2.66* (1.02) 3.09 (0.95) 0.0639
"I enjoy when I do not clear the forest." 3.04* (0.74) 3.34 (0.78) 0.0644
Guilt or regret 3.09 (0.77) 3.24 (0.69) 0.2527
"I would feel guilty if  I clear the forests." 3.09 (0.89) 3.37 (0.69) 0.1653
"I would regret if  I clear the forests." 3.09 (0.94) 3.11 (0.90) 0.4760
Social 2.26* (0.83) 2.62 (0.92) 0.0673
"I would be criticized by my neighbors if  I clear the forests." 2.19 (1.17) 2.25 (1.16) 0.4178
"Significant others would be upset if  I clear the forests." 2.33** (1.06) 3 (1.09) 0.0108
External, payments
"I would take care of the forests only if  I am paid to do so." 3.43 (1.07) 3.11 (1.16) 0.1622
External, fines
"I do not cut down the forest because of fear [of] fines." 1.95 (1.07) 2.23 (1.21) 0.2396
A-motivation
"I do not see what I can get by protecting the forests." 2 (1.18) 1.744 (1.05) 0.2341
†
Note that only 25.6% individuals that reported to have not cut forest and 47.6% that reported to have cut forest knew and reported the size of the productive area.
‡
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions has a P value of 0.415, so there are not significant differences in the distributions of income between the two groups.
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Table 3. Logistic model for binary variable of having cut down forests in the past controlling for biophysical, socio-demographic, and
motivation variables. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)





































































































































































































































Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Table 4. Correlation matrix of motivation variables. P values in parentheses.





Payments -0.4396 -0.2881 0.1536
(0.0003) (0.0210) (0.2257)
Fines 0.0202 0.0521 0.5194 0.1084
(0.8739) (0.6826) (0.0000) (0.3938)
Amotivated -0.0972 -0.0883 0.0256 0.1591 0.0567
(0.4448) (0.4876) (0.8411) (0.2092) (0.6565)
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Table 5. Logistic model for binary variable of having cut down forests in the past controlling for biophysical, socio-demographic, and
motivation variables. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
 
Variables (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)



























































































































































































Amotivated 1.096 1.442 1.474** 1.647** 0.730 1.031













Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50
motivated individuals report more deforestation. These results
are novel and contribute to understanding the drivers of
deforestation.  
Our results are important because motivational factors can
explain differences in self-reported deforestation even when
households do not have significant differences in their socio-
economic characteristics or the biophysical conditions of their
farms. Intrinsic motivations prevent deforestation, even in the
context of an active deforestation frontier. Social motivations and
guilt did not explain self-reported deforestation. This could be
related to the lack of social cohesion among community members
in this ongoing deforestation frontier with low levels of
associativity, very loose or nonexistent kinship ties, and little
social capital. Also, external motivations driven by expected fines
for cutting the forest did not explain deforestation, a result
consistent with the lack of enforcement and legitimacy of local
environmental authorities in the study region.  
One should be cautious about claiming causality with our
empirical strategy and results. Our data report farmers’
motivations at a certain point in time. Three months later, they
are asked to report the history of forest clearing at a time when
deforestation is a fait accompli. It could be argued that farmers
are just creating a consistent narrative of forest use or that clearing
practices determine motivations. In addition, we have no observed
behavior, i.e., actual changes in forest cover, and rely exclusively
on self-reported practices. Thus, at this point, we can only claim
association between our dependent and independent variables. In
addition, we acknowledge the small size of our sample and the
possibility of some variables becoming significant once we
increase it.  
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Nevertheless, motivations are significant, and our results open an
important and unexplored research agenda, and they raise
important considerations for the implementation of conservation
policies aiming at behavioral changes such as payment for
ecosystems services. In particular, our results highlight the
importance of considering the impacts on motivations when
designing, implementing, and evaluating the effects of such types
of policies to avoid possible crowding-out effects (Agrawal et al.
2015). Further research should move beyond self-reported
behavior to actual behavior to establish a causal relationship
between motivation and deforestation.  
The literature on environmental psychology has explored the
importance of motivations in determining urban proenvironmental
behavior, whereas the experimental economics literature has
explored the effect of economic incentives on individual
motivation and forest conservation behavior with mixed results
(Narloch et al. 2012, Moros et al. 2017, Salk et al. 2017). Thus,
empirical studies exploring the effect of different types of
motivations as drivers of deforestation are crucial for the design
of tailored policies that consider fundamental drivers of
individual behavior. Ignoring the role of motivations could affect
the expected impact of conservation policies and the durability
and stability of behavior over time.  
Understanding the role of proenvironmental motivations as
drivers of land-use change is the first step in a new research agenda
aimed at designing policies that attempt to change mental models,
via education and communication campaigns, along with
structural changes aimed at improving farmers’ poor social
conditions. Motivations can play a crucial role in the success of
interventions, especially in areas with low state presence and
limited capacity to enforce traditional command and control
interventions. New policies should aim to work on motivations,
because they are an important piece of the behavioral change
puzzle.
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APPENDIX 1. Questionnaire in Spanish (presented in the same order as Table 2)
Biophysical and productive characteristics of the farm and productive uses of the land 
¿Cuál es el tamaño de este predio?
¿Tiene café? (SI o NO)
¿Qué área tiene de café?
unidades
¿A quién le vende el café?
¿Tiene caña? (SI o NO)
¿Qué área tiene de caña?
¿Tiene pastos? (SI o NO)
¿Qué área tiene de pastos?
¿Tiene otros cultivos? (SI o NO)
¿Qué área tiene de otros cultivos?
¿Tiene bosque? (SI o NO)
¿Qué área tiene de bosque?
¿Tiene rastrojo? (SI o NO)
¿Qué área tiene de rastrojo?
¿Tiene ganado? (SI o NO)
¿Cuántas cabezas?
Socioeconomic characteristics of the household 
¿Hace cuántos años vive en esta finca?
¿Cuál es la situación legal de ESTE predio? (Escoger una)
• Tiene escritura y ESTÁ registrada en la oficina de registro
• Tiene escritura pero NO está registrada en la oficina de registro
• Tiene escritura pero NO SE si está registrada en la oficina de registro
• Tiene escritura pero está en proceso de sucesión
• Tiene promesa o papeles de compraventa pero no hay escritura
• Tiene posesión pero NO se tiene papeles
¿Hasta qué año estudió?
¿Cuál es su edad?
¿Me puede decir cuántas personas viven en esta finca?
Para cada persona que vive en la finca preguntar:
Sexo
Edad
¿Hasta qué año estudió?
¿Cuánto es el ingreso de su hogar mensualmente? (Mencionar que el hogar es la gente que vive en su casa y que el ingreso del hogar
es la suma de todos los ingresos que puedan tener los miembros del hogar)
¿Le gustaría que sus hijos se dedicaran a las labores del campo? (si ya tienen una profesión: ¿Le hubiera gustado?)
Social capital and social networks 
¿Usted es miembro de alguna organización o asociación productiva? ( SI, NO, ¿Cuál?)
Usted diría que la gente de esta vereda:
• Se ayudan mucho
• Se ayudan poco
• No se ayudan
Income sources 





¿Cuáles de estas actividades fueron fuentes de ingreso para su hogar en el último año? [Marcar solo las opciones que fueron fuente
de ingreso]
• Cultivos en mi predio para vender
• Madera o leña en mi predio para vender
• Madera o leña del bosque por fuera de mi predio para vender
• Ganado en mi predio
• Trabajo de jornalero en actividades agrícolas
• Por cuenta propia: construcción/industria/comercio/servicios
• Por salarios en construcción/servicios domésticos/industria/comercio /servicios/gobierno/educación
• Pensiones
• Plata que le mandan familiares o amigos desde afuera del país
• Programas del gobierno
• Otros
Motivations 
Le voy a leer unas frases. Le pido que por favor me diga si está de acuerdo con esa frase usando la siguiente escala: 1 es NO, 2 es UN
POCO, 3 es SI, DE ACUERDO, 4 es TOTALMENTE DE ACUERDO.
Disfruto cuando no tumbo el bosque
Soy del tipo de gente que no tumba el bosque
Me arrepiento si tumbo el bosque
Me siento culpable si tumbo el bosque
La gente más cercana a mí se molestaría conmigo si tumbo el bosque
Mis vecinos me criticarían si tumbo el bosque
Yo cuido el bosque SOLO si me pagan por hacerlo
Yo no tumbo el bosque por miedo a las multas que me pueda poner la autoridad ambiental
No veo qué puedo ganar conservando el bosque
Deforestation behavior 
¿Usted o alguien de su hogar ha tumbado bosque desde que llegó a su predio? (SI o NO)
